Latent Cognitive Reinforcement for Anti-Backdoor Strategy

Authors

  • Yanwen Wang School of Physics and Electronic Engineering, Northeast Petroleum University, Daqing, Heilongjiang 163318, China
  • Yanchang Liu School of Physics and Electronic Engineering, Northeast Petroleum University, Daqing, Heilongjiang 163318, China
  • Xiaorou Zhang School of Physics and Electronic Engineering, Northeast Petroleum University, Daqing, Heilongjiang 163318, China

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54097/bwmwmp38

Keywords:

Neural networks, Security, Backdoor attacks, Backdoor defense, Latent patterns

Abstract

With the widespread deployment of deep neural networks in sensitive applications, backdoor attacks have become a serious security concern. Such attacks enable adversaries to manipulate the prediction results without affecting the normal classification of clean samples by embedding hidden triggers in the model. Aiming at the limitations of existing defense methods in terms of adaptive attacks and generalization ability, this paper proposes the Latent Cognitive Reinforcement (LCR) backdoor defense strategy. The method utilizes a multi-layer feature representation of the intermediate and output layers to extract the cognitive patterns of the model, thereby identifying and eliminating potential backdoor trigger signals. Compared with traditional methods such as anomaly detection, neuron pruning, or adversarial training, LCR is more generalized and robust. Experiments on two datasets, CIFAR-10 and GTSRB, and five mainstream model architectures prove that LCR achieves an average of 91.80% in detection performance (AUROC), which significantly outperforms the existing state-of-the-art defense techniques and demonstrates good cross-model and cross-attack scenario adaptability.

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References

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Published

15-04-2026

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Section

Articles

How to Cite

Wang, Y., Liu, Y., & Zhang, X. (2026). Latent Cognitive Reinforcement for Anti-Backdoor Strategy. Academic Journal of Applied Sciences, 1(2), 39-45. https://doi.org/10.54097/bwmwmp38